

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems

Spring, 2001

11 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 77

LENGTH: 15237 words

SYMPOSIUM: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISABILITY: HISTORICAL, CONTEMPORARY, AND COMPARATIVE VIEWS: Disabled Veterans and Public Welfare Policy: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives on Western States in the Twentieth Century

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LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:

... War has probably been the most abiding cause of disability in human history, eclipsed perhaps in recent centuries only by the grinding daily toll of industrial accidents. ... These examples of the benefits of a transnational analysis omit one significant aspect of the disabled veteran's history - the veterans' agency on their own behalf. ... The Belgians had done relatively advanced work in civilian vocational rehabilitation prior to the war and had a strong commitment to the new progressivist understandings about disability and work that underlie vocational rehabilitation. ... Though eventually the effort would involve German state governments and some of Germany's largest industrial employers, most vocational rehabilitation of disabled veterans remained decentralized, private, and based on voluntary efforts. ... The desire to control and track disabled veterans through vocational rehabilitation was certainly not unique, but German efforts seem overdetermined. ... Based on pre-war practices, the desire to break disabled veterans of the temptations of *renten-hysterie* ("pension hysteria" - the obsessive preoccupation with material compensation), and calculations of cost containment and war-time labor needs, vocational rehabilitation was guided by the frequently and strongly articulated belief in aggressive normalization of even the most severely disabled man. ... In Germany, by contrast, aggressive normalization brought physical and vocational rehabilitation together as soon as disabled men, who were still under military control, could leave their beds. ...

TEXT:

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I. Introduction

War is an ancient and common feature of human civilizations, as are injury, illness, and permanent impairment caused by war. War has probably been the most abiding cause of disability in human history, ⁿ¹ eclipsed perhaps in recent centuries only by the grinding daily toll of industrial accidents. Understandably, mythologies, histories, and other types of war narratives have long recognized the singular problem of disabled combat veterans. ⁿ² Their lasting impairments caused this recognition, and so, too, have popular narratives that valorize veterans' sacrifices on behalf of states and peoples. Such praise has nonetheless often stood in stark contrast to the neglect disabled veterans have experienced when war ended, memories faded, and governments, worried about large expenditures, declined to invest adequate

funds to assist them in reconstructing their lives.

Over the last two centuries, the scope and scale of wars have increased, and the mass mobilizations for actual or anticipated wars have dipped deeper into widening circles of civilian populations. The lethal violence of warfare has also grown in intensity, but medical science has vastly improved its ability to save the lives of battlefield casualties.ⁿ³ As a consequence, the ranks of the surviving military war disabled have grown. These are not, as in the distant past, long-term conscripts or professional soldiers, but ordinary people, who cannot effortlessly return to the worlds of work and family from which they came. In spite of reluctance by the able-bodied public to focus on veterans' often severe impairments that suggest our own vulnerability, and in spite of post-war desires to rapidly restore peacetime normality and to cut **[*79]** government expenditures from war-time levels, gradually governments have realized that these veterans must in some measure be the responsibility of the state which used them in the service of its interests.

II. The Historical Importance of Veterans' Benefits Internationally

Confronting these problems has marked an important element in the history of modern state-making. Through veterans' policy, which has often been the cutting edge of the expansion of government welfare activities, states have found it necessary to develop new institutions and programs, which have simultaneously expanded their exercise of record keeping; sorting, surveillance, and discipline of individual citizens; indexing needs of groups in the population; and maintaining large, permanent bureaucratic agencies. Such functions have been an important exercise of modern state-building. States have thus come to control and determine the destinies of large numbers of civilians. Through the distribution of benefits and of administrative roles in the management of benefit programs, they have legitimized new social movements and interest groups as clients and allies. As a result of all of these activities, states have significantly enhanced their power.ⁿ⁴ This Article focuses on how states responded to, or failed to respond to, the challenge created by disabled veterans; the influences they chose to adopt or reject; how and what the states learned from their mistakes and the mistakes of others; and what consequences states faced because of their activities.

In spite of the common and continuous nature of war and the resulting impairments to increasing numbers of people, this topic remains elusive. Although more has been written about war and disability in connection with public welfare policy than any other matter involving disabled veterans, there are a number of limitations on an historian's ability to speak with confidence. The literature, which is engaged in behaviorist microanalysis of technical questions arising out of legislation, especially pension compensation rates and the categorization for pension benefit distribution of injuries and impairments,ⁿ⁵ or of regulatory practices, is, from an historian's viewpoint, **[*80]** both limited in its focus and narrowly contextualized in at least three ways.

First, links to culture and society, beyond politics, welfare policy, and state-building initiatives are neglected, especially when it comes to thinking about the complex problem of disability. Rather than a fixed medical condition, disability is a socially and culturally constructed category, highly sensitive to time and place.ⁿ⁶ The story of disabled veterans is not complete without analyzing the ways representation and discourse transform functional impairments into fixed handicaps or disabilities in various historical environments. Such an analysis must include an effort to understand the experience of becoming disabled and the agency of disabled veterans on their own behalf. Hence, it is necessary to pay close attention to the ways that class, race, gender, and ethnicity intersect with military, medical, rehabilitation, and state institutions to form cohorts of disabled veterans.

Second, large categories of populations of injured persons have been omitted from the research agenda, including war-time civilian industrial workers, victims of air raids, irregular and guerrilla forces, colonial troops, and women in uniform in combat and non-combat roles. The analysis of female disabled veterans and disabled veterans outside the developed, European and neo-Europeanⁿ⁷ world has barely begun, and at this time must be reconstructed from limited and often anecdotal sources. This Article will analyze histories largely, though not exclusively, about male veterans in European and neo-European societies. These limitations, however, do not make these histories less significant. Male military veterans are a large portion of those impaired by war and remain so today. From the standpoint of the continuous experience of lethal modern warfare, the histories of these societies provide a great deal of information

about the range of problems, palliatives, and solutions available when confronting impairments resulting from war.

Third, and of particular relevance to this Article, comparative and transnational frameworks have been variously neglected in the historiography of disabled veterans and public welfare policy. A comparative **[*81]** framework on this subject systematically and simultaneously analyzes the experiences of at least two societies, which are conceptually cross-referenced in order to understand both common and divergent patterns. There are, of course, many types of possible specific comparisons: not only those between nations, but also those between cohorts of differently disabled men, and between disabled veterans of earlier and later wars.

National comparisons appear most often in the context of modern public policy research for two reasons. First, to a certain extent, the state has guided modern public policy. Second, common patterns for confronting the problem of assisting disabled veterans - rooted in the common national histories, cultures, or structures - have developed within nation-states. While seldom dealt with in-depth or in an extended analysis, some useful comparative work does exist. Much of this work focuses on World War I when, for the first time in modern history, large numbers of societies confronted massive numbers of disabled veterans. ⁿ⁸

III. The World War I Experience and the Veterans' Welfare System

While precedents existed for veterans' welfare systems before World War I, especially in the workings and consequences of the federal pension system created in the decades after the U.S. Civil War, the World War I experience gave rise to the modern veterans' welfare system. ⁿ⁹ In the late nineteenth and especially the twentieth centuries, developed Western societies created the modern general welfare states with universalized entitlement programs touching millions of civilians. ⁿ¹⁰ Although general ideas and assumptions have been shared and applied across boundaries, the two welfare systems, veteran and civilian, have rarely merged extensively on a practical level. While the veterans welfare system has been singularly more generous, especially to disabled veterans, than the general welfare state has been to civilians, the **[*82]** latter is clearly the development of greater historical significance. It has encompassed more people, involved a massive redistribution of society's capital surplus, and given rise to much more intense and abiding political controversy. Not surprisingly, it has received more extended analytical attention, including comparative treatment. ⁿ¹¹ At any rate, the two systems are not often analyzed together. For example, two excellent, recent syncretical works on the history of the U.S. welfare system have little more than occasional references to provisions for disabled veterans. ⁿ¹²

IV. Transnational Frameworks

Transnational frameworks have been neglected even more than comparative ones, though the mine of experience that may be investigated is singularly rich. This Article defines a transnational analysis ⁿ¹³ as one that traces the ways that societies jointly confront tasks, such as assisting disabled veterans. This may occur formally or informally, and whether or not they are fully conscious of what they share in their activities. Nations may choose to copy one another's actions or consciously choose to avoid making the mistakes of others. The path to imitation or rejection may be direct or circuitous. In whatever ways these interactions precisely unfold, a transnational analysis is an examination of international discourses, influences, and authoritative experiences.

Some examples of the development of transnational activities in the histories of disabled veterans will show the ways in which societies are implicated in one another's policy-making and suggest the richness of this largely unexplored analytical territory. Societies have often consciously copied one another's policy initiatives.

A. The French Example of Care for Disabled Veterans

The modeling of other nation's treatment of disabled veterans is evident in the history of early modern domiciliary facilities for disabled veterans. ⁿ¹⁴ **[*83]** Though the size of its increasingly non-professional armies grew alongside the increasing incidence of its wars, late seventeenth century France did not have a system of providing for disabled

veterans. Those veterans, who gathered in Paris, caused growing problems by begging, stealing, and pickpocketing.ⁿ¹⁵ Traditionally, disabled veterans became lay brothers in monasteries where monks cared for them.ⁿ¹⁶ This system, however, was breaking down.ⁿ¹⁷ Like other early modern European monarchs, Louis XIV was a nation-builder. He was conscious of the fact that in consolidating his power, state-controlled national institutions served highly instrumental purposes.ⁿ¹⁸ In 1674, he established the Hotel Royal des Invalides.ⁿ¹⁹ Despite a variety of political regimes, the Hotel enjoyed a centuries-long existence as France's central facility for rehabilitating, educating, and retraining disabled veterans.ⁿ²⁰ Inspired by France's example, England founded Chelsea Hospital (1682) for army veterans and Greenwich Hospital (1705) for navy veterans.ⁿ²¹ Legislation from 1777 establishes that the United States originally intended West Point, the military academy, to serve as an institution for disabled soldiers of the Revolutionary War based on the model of the Hotel des Invalides.ⁿ²²

B. The United States and the Civil War

Pension laws provide examples not only of conscious borrowing, but also of conscious rejection of other states' activities. The United States based its federal Civil War pension scheme for Union veterans on a number of European features, including differential benefits by rank and features of the 1831 French pension system that established rates on the basis of the nature and degree of war-related physical injury.ⁿ²³ However, in the late nineteenth century, against the intentions of its founders, the federal pension system [*84] gradually evolved into an old age pension for all of the aging Union veterans.ⁿ²⁴

By 1893, over one million men were receiving pensions totaling \$ 165,000,000 a year, 40% of the total federal budget.ⁿ²⁵ By 1900, 30% of Northern-born white males 55-59 years of age and 18% of Northern-born white males age 60-64 were receiving federal military pensions.ⁿ²⁶ This history became a negative reference point for societies, including the United States, that faced the need to provide for massive numbers of disabled World War I veterans. It lurked in the background as an example of budget-busting veterans politics, through which veterans, politicians, and veterans' organizations worked to turn those once valorized as selfless heroes into modern, lobbying mendicants.

C. Canada, Australia, and the British Commonwealth

Early in World War I, for example, Canadian planners sought to frame Canada's pension scheme against the two most influential poles of its national experience.ⁿ²⁷ It rejected both the experience of the United States and the British tradition of largely ignoring the needs of ordinary disabled veterans, while maintaining a benefit program for its officers' class, who largely came out of the aristocratic elite.ⁿ²⁸ One alternative resource available to Canada was the example of other Commonwealth countries. Australia took full advantage of this example in 1929.ⁿ²⁹ After a study of other Commonwealth nations, it reformed the appeals process through which disabled World War I veterans could protest the rejection of compensation claims.ⁿ³⁰

D. Veterans During the Era of the Cold War

The line between conscious borrowing and severely constrained policy-making or practice seems especially thin when poorer states and peoples depend on wealthier allies for assistance. This was frequently the case for clients of the hegemonic powers during the Cold War. The example of the Palestinians during the first Intifada in the 1980s, as observed by the [*85] disabled National Public Radio correspondent John Hockenberry, suggests this.ⁿ³¹ Hockenberry, then on assignment in the Middle East, found that across the 1948 Green Line in technologically advanced Israel, a very high standard of care and rehabilitative services existed for the country's many disabled veterans.ⁿ³² For the disabled members of the Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation, who saw themselves and were seen by their people as veterans of a national liberation struggle and in some cases were members of irregular military forces, a most inadequate system of care and rehabilitation existed.ⁿ³³

The poor quality of wheelchairs available to those Palestinians suffering a leg amputation or paralysis serves as one aspect of this inadequacy.ⁿ³⁴ These were in sharp contrast to the latest models manufactured or imported by the

Israelis. The Palestinians' chairs were heavy, not adaptable to the particular needs of individuals, and in poor repair which made navigation of the hilly terrain of the West Bank and the sandy terrain of the Gaza Strip difficult.ⁿ³⁵ The wheelchairs set definite limits on the rehabilitation of the mostly young men who had no choice but to try to use them. Most resigned themselves to lying in bed or, in the case of those with spinal cord injuries, hoping for some surgical intervention that would instantly normalize their condition.ⁿ³⁶ These wheelchairs were a gift from the Palestinians' Warsaw Pact allies who were, if the experience of the Soviet Union is representative,ⁿ³⁷ far behind the capitalist West in the rehabilitation of disabled soldiers and civilians in the production of assistive technologies.ⁿ³⁸

E. Veterans' Agency on Their Own Behalf

These examples of the benefits of a transnational analysis omit one significant aspect of the disabled veteran's history - the veterans' agency on their own behalf. Disabled veterans have been a particularly well-organized segment of modern society, and in democracies with interest-group politics, they have influenced and stimulated state activity. They have also at times maintained intense relationships with one another across national [*86] boundaries for the purpose of sharing common experiences, consulting about common problems, and exchanging views on how to influence governments.ⁿ³⁹

Australian veterans of the Vietnam War consulted with U.S. Vietnam veterans in mounting their own case for state compensation for ailments attributed to the use of the herbicide Agent Orange in the battlefields of Southeast Asia.ⁿ⁴⁰ While military and political leaders in both the Soviet Union and the United States did not accept the contention that there was a close parallel between the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s and the Afghan conflict of the 1980s, Soviet and U.S. disabled veterans viewed the matter differently.ⁿ⁴¹ Both felt that they were victims of an indifferent public that wished to forget unpopular, divisive conflicts, the purposes of which many had never understood, or with which they had not agreed.ⁿ⁴² Both groups of disabled veterans felt abandoned to varying degrees by their governments.ⁿ⁴³ In the late 1980s, Russian and U.S. disabled veterans began consultations on mutual concerns.ⁿ⁴⁴ Through this dialogue, U.S. veterans helped in the creation of programs that supplied assistive technologies, such as wheelchairs, which were inadequate or in short supply in the Soviet Union.ⁿ⁴⁵

V. The World War I Experience: A Case Study in Comparative and Transnational Analysis

One essay cannot bring together all of the experiences, structures, and contingencies that might be formed by comparative and transnational analyses, conceived within a global framework. It may be instructive, however, to concentrate on the experience of a relatively small number of nation-states during one time period. The World War I years present themselves as a particularly significant time period for a case study in which one may observe critical variables at work. Unprecedented numbers of disabled soldiers, whose ranks began to swell within weeks of the inception of the war, forced the major belligerents to confront their needs.

By April 1915, only eight months after the fifty-month-long war began, Britain saw approximately 3,000 disabled men return from the front each [*87] month.ⁿ⁴⁶ In total, 752,000 British men were left permanently disabled.ⁿ⁴⁷ By war's end, Germany had more than 4,000,000 surviving wounded, and some 1,537,000 German veterans were categorized as disabled.ⁿ⁴⁸ France counted just over 1,000,000 veterans as sick or injured due to the war that year.ⁿ⁴⁹ In 1920, the conflict had disabled 70,000 Canadian and 200,000 U.S. veterans, significant numbers relative to the total population of Canada and to the relatively short time (twenty months) the United States had been in the war.ⁿ⁵⁰

Although limited to European and neo-European nations, this situation has implications for worlds and experiences beyond it. Its mass violence and terrible toll of morbidity, mortality, and permanent injury foreshadows the consequences of wars throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Wars outside Europe, like the Iran-Iraq War,ⁿ⁵¹ might be protracted conflicts with an immense scale of armed engagement and massive numbers of casualties.

Even within the family of European and neo-European societies engaged in World War I, national differences of

history, culture, and social development emerged alongside similarities rooted in war-time situational contingencies and shared levels of capitalist industrial development. The differences sensitize us to the diversity of situations, ideologies, discourses, and representations that countries confront in looking at wars in emerging, modernizing non-European states.

Finally, Germany in World War I provides a perspective on the consequences of defeat for state efforts on behalf of disabled veterans. However precisely defined or experienced, defeat is an abiding feature of war that may have contradictory implications for state assistance to disabled veterans. It may set material and psychological constraints on state actions, as the German example ultimately suggests.ⁿ⁵² But defeat may also, as the example of the U.S. Southern states of the Confederacy suggests, inspire civic and state action that, against formidable odds, overcomes difficulties and finds ways to accomplish extraordinarily generous assistance.ⁿ⁵³ Either way, **[*88]** the reality of defeat must be factored into any conceptualization of the state's relations to disabled veterans.

This Article employs a comparative and transnational perspective in five areas of the World War I experience: (1) the experience that nation-states brought to the crisis of the disabled veteran prompted by World War I; (2) goals nation-states sought to meet in drafting their policies; (3) programs created in response to those goals; (4) implementation of those policies and institutionalization of programs, including both their intended and unintended consequences; and (5) veterans' agency in the creation, implementation, and modification of policies and programs. This Article develops as an example vocational rehabilitation, which has the advantage of providing substantial insight into changing understandings of disability. In connection with vocational rehabilitation, moreover, it is necessary to discuss in a contextualizing role, pension policies, which have always been of general concern. There are other areas of state activity to analyze, such as assistive technologies, domiciliary residential facilities, hospitals, and general medical care, but they did not assume the same centrality in state activities at the time.

A. Historical Background: Vocational Rehabilitation

The historical background to vocational rehabilitation initiatives during World War I lies not in the experience of work with disabled veterans, but rather with the civilian victims of industrial accidents.ⁿ⁵⁴ Few nations anywhere developed programs prior to World War I to restore disabled veterans to productive work in the mainstream economy. The sole examples in literature of these limited and localized efforts are in Great Britain after the Boer War, in Petrograd after the Russo-Japanese War, and in Paris in the late 1890s.ⁿ⁵⁵

Mass industrialization and national economic and political competition created a context for new thinking about rehabilitation. In the largely unregulated industrial economies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, workers suffered an epidemic of industrial accidents. Society recognized that it had to go beyond consigning industrial accident victims to lives of inactivity and demoralization on a non-existent or insufficient pension.ⁿ⁵⁶

[*89] A growing consensus in industrial nations came to see the matter in terms of modernist and progressive values like individual opportunity, social efficiency, public planning, state action, and the conservation of national workforces.ⁿ⁵⁷ The elaborate specialization of advanced industrial economies seemed to suggest that such severely disabled individuals as the blinded, those with spinal-cord injuries, and amputees might find jobs.

This consensus, which crossed national boundaries, including those separating the major belligerents fighting the war, was not the result of states simultaneously reaching the same conclusions in isolation from one another. Looking at this emerging consensus from a transnational perspective, we find new rehabilitation professions were emerging in the industrialized nations.ⁿ⁵⁸ These professionals engaged in internationalized discourses about their work in professional organizations, conferences, and literatures.ⁿ⁵⁹

B. Vocational Rehabilitation in World War I

This is clear in the emergence of World War I vocational rehabilitation, for the scientific, professional attitude pervades

the literature on rehabilitation of veterans and competes with parochial national loyalties. An example is provided by two major, syncretical contemporary studies, published during and just after the war, about the inception among the warring nations of vocational rehabilitation for injured and ill military personnel.ⁿ⁶⁰ Both were authored by a rehabilitation professional, Douglas C. [*90] McMurtrie, who was director of the Red Cross Institute for Crippled and Disabled Men, President of the Federation of Associations of Cripples, and editor of the American Journal of Care of Cripples.ⁿ⁶¹ McMurtrie dispenses criticism and praise for the rehabilitation work being done completely without reference to the national rivalries in the conflict. The author is eager to learn from German rehabilitation practices and finds much of the German work in vocational rehabilitation worthy of emulation.ⁿ⁶² The author approves the clarity of German aims in vocational rehabilitation and the efficiency with which they accomplished the work.ⁿ⁶³ He also highly praises German work in the field of prosthetics, in which German design continued to set high standards for functionality during the war, even among the nation's enemies.ⁿ⁶⁴

For rehabilitation specialists, therefore, the war was an opportunity to benefit from one another's experiences and to claim expertise and professional legitimacy. Their participation in transnational war-time and post-war discourses about policies and programs for rehabilitation helped produce the consensus in favor of a national commitment to returning the injured and ill to the workforce. The programs that resulted may be seen as test cases for the development of the modernist vision of these professionals.

This vision took on importance as an exemplar of possibilities for people with disabilities in modern industrial society, beyond the problem immediately posed by the cohort of severely disabled veterans. In proportion to the amount of attention focused on this problem and the scale of resources employed, there were relatively few men ultimately finding their way into vocational rehabilitation. Toward the end of the war, it was estimated that of all surviving casualties during the conflict, eighty percent could be returned to their units after treatment.ⁿ⁶⁵ Of the remaining twenty percent, one-fifth would be permanently disabled, but half of these men, though requiring various types of assistance such as prosthetics and ongoing medical treatment, could return to their old jobs.ⁿ⁶⁶ The remainder of the permanently disabled, including most of the blinded, hearing-impaired, amputees, spinal cord-injured, and a portion of the neuropsychiatric casualties, required vocational rehabilitation if they were ever to work again. Of course, in [*91] absolute numbers, the size of this rapidly emerging cohort was still unprecedented, and it would be augmented after the war as the condition of the wounded deteriorated. Moreover, the debt owed to these soldiers for their sacrifices greatly influenced significant efforts on their behalf. The impulse to assist in the restoration of these impaired veterans was determined by forces outside the experience of the war because it was lodged in the heart of new understandings of work and citizens as societal resources. This understanding had great significance for changing understandings of disability and the destinies of people with disabilities.

The emergence of pension programs that sought to provide compensation, while simultaneously encouraging individuals to work, expressed this consensus. Nations used pensions as both an expression of gratitude and as a payment for sacrifices resulting in impairments that often made it impossible to live at the level of life enjoyed, or anticipated, before becoming impaired. Pensions were also understood among policymakers as part of the framework for the conservation of national human resources.

As the U.S. Civil War demonstrated, however, an overly generous pension program wasted national resources through constantly increasing benefit packages and caused the emergence of the political fixation of post-war veterans on benefits. Moreover, overly generous pensions might discourage men from employment. Yet pension rates that took money away in progressive increments, as one became healthier and stronger through physical therapy, and more self-supporting through vocational rehabilitation, discouraged the desire for retraining and reintegration. Different states might fine-tune pension programs through different approaches to apportioning benefits and might explain their programs in terms expressing different balances between the core values of debt and gratitude, subsidy toward a decent standard of living, and compensation for services. By the end of World War I, however, all of the major belligerents had come to understand that pension programs could achieve cost effectiveness, enhance the national workforce, and encourage men to normalize their circumstances and become self-supporting only if they provided disabled veterans with incentives to undertake vocational rehabilitation and return to work.ⁿ⁶⁷

Great Britain illustrated this evolution during the war. Pension legislation, passed in 1916, geared disability pension benefits to anticipation of decreased earning capacity. Therefore, individuals with increases in income, which might be the case with those undertaking vocational rehabilitation, experienced a proportionate loss of pension money. The problem with this system soon became apparent. In 1917, new pension legislation established a benefit structure tied to the degree of injury alone. Benefits might decrease if the individual's physical condition improved; however, benefits would not decrease if the individual earned more money. [*92] This effectively removed the disincentive to undertake vocational rehabilitation, get a job, and improve one's income. ⁿ⁶⁸

This emerging consensus on vocational rehabilitation for the most severely disabled veterans nonetheless left a large number of significant issues in need of resolution. In addition to the related pension questions, at least twelve issues appear frequently in discussions of individual national vocational rehabilitation programs. They involve organization and control of the programs, control of the men undertaking vocational rehabilitation, the curriculum and pedagogy of the school-oriented programs, and methods of ensuring successful results. These issues include:

- . What should be the balance between local and centralized programs?
- . What should be the balance between public and private (and voluntary) initiatives?
- . Should vocational rehabilitation be compulsory or voluntary?
- . Whether compulsory or voluntary, should the men undertaking vocational rehabilitation continue to be under military discipline?
- . Should the men undertaking vocational rehabilitation be paid during their retraining?
- . How early in an individual's course of recovery should vocational rehabilitation take place, and in what sequence were occupational therapy, physical therapy, and vocational rehabilitation to be introduced?
- . Which type of training would be most effective: apprenticing men in private craft shops or factories, or instructing them in schools?
- . What type of teacher would be most effective in motivating and instructing severely disabled veterans: veterans or civilians, vocational rehabilitation professionals or staff from existing technical institutes, or men with disabilities?
- . Would programs be more cost effective and successful in accomplishing their instructional aims if they separated men into cohorts defined by types of impairments, or brought them together across the lines of injury or illness?
- . What was to be the balance between the teaching of industrial skills suitable for modern factories and traditional village artisanal trades as shoemaking, tailoring, harness-making, carpentry, basket-making, and making cookware?
- . What would be the role of labor unions in the integration of graduates of vocational rehabilitation programs into unionized workplaces and [*93] unionized trades?
- . Were aggressive public campaigns criticizing discrimination against disabled veteran workers necessary to gain their acceptance, or should governments depend on some combination of quiet negotiation and employers' feelings of patriotic obligation to achieve their acceptance?

VI. Explaining the Varying Responses of Nations

Anyone who seeks overarching historical, cultural, or structural explanations for the differences between states and societies in responding to these issues is likely to be rightly accused of reductionism. Some telling national differences point to different national cultural traditions, stages of social development, and patterns of state-building. Allowance must be made, however, for situational contingencies. One of these was certainly, as the British example suggests,

shortages of workers in war industries.ⁿ⁶⁹ At the time when nations created these programs, vocational rehabilitation that yielded quick results appeared crucial to the war production effort.ⁿ⁷⁰ Differing common sense calculations of cost effectiveness and efficiency are another situational factor. These probably express decisions made by small, hard-pressed groups of politicians and medical and rehabilitation professionals in the context of complex interpersonal and interagency processes and pressing deadlines. There is probably no deep-seated reason in national histories to explain why the Canadian province of Alberta used skilled workers as teachers in vocational rehabilitation programs while Great Britain used the staffs of existing pre-war technical institutes, and the United States used vocational rehabilitation professionals. Calculations of cost and efficiency made under difficult circumstances probably explain these choices.ⁿ⁷¹

A. The Responses of Belgium and Italy: Contrasting Examples of National Policy

Belgium and Canada were the first countries to organize vocational rehabilitation under central, national authority. Belgium provides an example of the logic of the immediate situation in influencing national policy-making. The Belgians had done relatively advanced work in civilian vocational rehabilitation prior to the war and had a strong commitment to the new progressivist understandings about disability and work that underlie vocational rehabilitation. This does little, however, to explain the Belgians' decision to make vocational rehabilitation compulsory and to keep the men undertaking it under military discipline.

[*94] Instead, it was the German army's occupation of Belgium at the start of the war that turned the Belgians in this direction. A substantial portion of the Belgian armed forces were exiled in France. These men had no country to call home and nowhere to return. The necessity of preserving their morale while in exile and attempting to keep them from begging on the streets of France loomed large in the minds of Belgian authorities. In addition, the Belgian authorities sought to preserve the few national resources still available to the Belgians at the time. Belgium established two vocational rehabilitation schools in France during the war and moved to exert strict control of disabled veterans.ⁿ⁷²

While reaching decisions from different points-of-view, most nations agreed with the Belgians in resolving issues of control in favor of various forms of coercion. This did not mean a complete absence of positive incentives, such as wages for schooling and the promise of regular employment, for the disabled to undertake vocational rehabilitation. Rather, disabled veterans understood that by taking advantage of both pensions and enhanced job prospects, many of them might experience the only opportunity for socioeconomic mobility that they would have in their lives.ⁿ⁷³ At least in material terms, they might be better off than before their injuries.

Enough doubt existed, based on practical calculations about how disabled veterans might behave, that governments felt that it was necessary to combine optimistic calculations and positive incentives with some combination of compulsion and military discipline. Policymakers assumed at that time, severely disabled men might reason that enough had already been asked of them, that their pensions would provide well enough for them, and that the best place for them was at home, being cared for by their families.ⁿ⁷⁴ Hence, they further assumed that disabled veterans would not volunteer for vocational rehabilitation and that at the first signs of frustration with the curriculum and with their own limitations, they would become discouraged and leave before completing the course.ⁿ⁷⁵ Moreover, the professional elites and political authorities who created these programs had many negative cultural and class stereotypes about the working class majorities that populated the conscripted military forces of World War I. As a result of these assumptions and prejudices, these programs emphasized control.ⁿ⁷⁶

[*95] In the creation of vocational rehabilitation programs, underlying historical and societal causalities do strongly assert themselves, alongside situational contingencies and abiding, commonly held elitist assumptions about the working classes. Italy and, as we shall shortly see, Germany demonstrate this dense web of influences. In the early twentieth century, Italy was a recently, but weakly, unified nation-state characterized by profound regional disparities of wealth and development.ⁿ⁷⁷ Relative to Northern Italy and Northern and Western Europe, much of the south of the country especially was pre-industrial and impoverished.ⁿ⁷⁸ Elites saw the southern peasantry as stupid, backward, and an impediment to national unity and modernization.ⁿ⁷⁹ High rates of illiteracy and low levels of skills, even in

agriculture, were common.ⁿ⁸⁰

Prior to 1914, little institutionalized vocational rehabilitation had taken place in Italy, so during the war the Italian program was invented quickly, and to some extent improvisationally, from the ground up.ⁿ⁸¹ But these programs were nonetheless consciously conceived almost immediately as an opportunity to gain greater control of the peasantry.ⁿ⁸² Vocational rehabilitation was not compulsory, but the men who undertook it found their terms of military service extended for the six months of the program, in the belief - in McMurtrie's understated summation - that peasants could not be properly trained without "the aid of military discipline."ⁿ⁸³ Beliefs about peasants, in the specific context of national goals, also determined that the disabled veterans' enrollment term in vocational rehabilitation would last longer than in other European programs, and that basic literacy and modern farming techniques, as well as crafts and trades, would make up parts of the curriculum.ⁿ⁸⁴

[*96]

B. A Look at the German Program

Germany provides an example of the larger ideology and culture of the nation-state being singularly inscribed in the workings of a vocational rehabilitation program, alongside the institutionalization of situational calculations of the war-time moment. Prior to World War I, Germany performed the most advanced rehabilitation and reintegration work, including vocational rehabilitation, among people with disabilities in the industrialized world.ⁿ⁸⁵

Active in this field was a unique, well-established, and private national professional and advocacy organization called the Deutsche Vereinigung für Krüppelfürsorge (German Organization for Assistance to Cripples), which defined professional standards, articulated goals, and coordinated programs.ⁿ⁸⁶ Within the first days of the war, Germans worked on rehabilitating disabled military personnel under the direction of the organization and its leader, prominent orthopedic surgeon Konrad Biesalski.ⁿ⁸⁷ The German system was not invented in the midst of the war-time crisis; rather, the work closely followed the outlines of pre-war efforts.ⁿ⁸⁸ The organization tailored well-established practices and expectations to war-time conditions.ⁿ⁸⁹ Though eventually the effort would involve German state governments and some of Germany's largest industrial employers, most vocational rehabilitation of disabled veterans remained decentralized, private, and based on voluntary efforts.ⁿ⁹⁰

The work was not, however, amateurish. It was well organized, systematic, and exerted a considerable degree of well-coordinated control on the disabled veterans involved. The desire to control and track disabled veterans through vocational rehabilitation was certainly not unique, but German efforts seem overdetermined. The process of vocational rehabilitation and the ideology and language mobilized for its explanation bore distinct traces of the authoritarian qualities of civil society and of politics in Wilhelmine Imperial Germany.ⁿ⁹¹

[*97] Based on pre-war practices, the desire to break disabled veterans of the temptations of *renten-hysterie* ("pension hysteria" - the obsessive preoccupation with material compensation), and calculations of cost containment and war-time labor needs, vocational rehabilitation was guided by the frequently and strongly articulated belief in aggressive normalization of even the most severely disabled man. The expectation was that each man would be prepared to return, at the earliest possible moment, to his home, his old job, and his former station of life, and that the community must be prepared to accept him. There was much dependence on the characteristically German rhetoric of the triumphant will, or as the U.S. policy analyst Edward T. Devine characterized it, the "Spartan insistence on effort and determination,"ⁿ⁹² to articulate this vision. A work of inspirational literature for the disabled titled *Der Wille Siegt* (The Will Conquers) provides an example, as does Biesalski's memorable articulation of a guiding principle of German efforts, "when we muster the iron will to overcome it, the era of cripples will be behind us."ⁿ⁹³

In Great Britain and elsewhere, physical rehabilitation and occupational therapy preceded vocational rehabilitation because of the belief that strengthening the body and focusing the mind on problems beyond the physical body must be a gradual process. Disabled veterans needed time to adjust to their new condition.ⁿ⁹⁴

In Germany, by contrast, aggressive normalization brought physical and vocational rehabilitation together as soon as disabled men, who were still under military control, could leave their beds.ⁿ⁹⁵ They were then moved rapidly, in lock-step, toward civilian life.ⁿ⁹⁶ Physical exercise, under the direction of military officers, took place in the hospital.ⁿ⁹⁷ Simultaneously, military authorities worked with civilian vocational rehabilitation teachers to begin the work of rapid retraining. Soon after retraining, the disabled veterans were placed in jobs.ⁿ⁹⁸ Aggressive campaigns denouncing discrimination against disabled workers, aimed at both employers and the general public, accompanied these efforts.ⁿ⁹⁹

[*98] Outside Germany, social work professionals and policy analysts, like McMurtrie and Devine, might recoil at the authoritarian language and practices of German rehabilitation work, which seemed to them insensitive to deny the individuality of disabled veterans and leave too little time for readjustment. But they did not choose to argue with the impressive results the Germans claimed toward the end of the war - approximately ninety percent of the disabled men undertaking vocational rehabilitation were said to have been placed in jobs in the mainstream economy.ⁿ¹⁰⁰

Far from being reversed, these efforts, though reorganized, were actually strengthened after the war and after the revolution that overthrew the Imperial regime and installed the Weimar Republic. In the name of efficiently marshalling the relatively scarce resources of a defeated nation on behalf of disabled veterans, the Republic quashed the voluntary sector and largely took over the work of vocational rehabilitation and job placement.ⁿ¹⁰¹ Moreover, unlike France, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany itself before the Revolution, all of which depended on voluntary agreements with employers to hire disabled veterans,ⁿ¹⁰² under the Republic, legislation in 1920 mandated compulsory, quota-based employment of disabled veterans for all firms with more than twenty-five employees.ⁿ¹⁰³

This policy ensured employment for many disabled veterans, including the most severely disabled, even during the worst days of the Great Depression. The 1920 legislation also established perhaps the most generous veterans pension system among European nations. Within a few years, the Republic spent twenty percent of its budget on pensions for disabled veterans and other war victims, such as widows and orphans of men killed in battle and injured civilians.ⁿ¹⁰⁴

Nonetheless, German disabled veterans experienced difficulties. They complained bitterly that the state ran cold and impersonal programs, that pension rates were still too low, and that most of the veterans could only secure employment in low-paying, menial positions, which left many men far below the station they occupied before the war.ⁿ¹⁰⁵ Relative to Germany's former principal adversary, Great Britain, however, the situation of German disabled veterans was good. Britain's disabled veterans experienced inadequate pensions, employers who were uncooperative with voluntary schemes to employ disabled veterans, widespread unemployment, and **[*99]** endemic poverty, especially for men with families. The government briefly experimented with more centrally directed employment programs just after the war, but terminated them because they became too expensive when a severe economic contraction began in 1920.ⁿ¹⁰⁶

VII. Veterans' Organizations and Interactions with the State

Disabled veterans did have resources for dealing with the state and its various agents. The principal vehicle for asserting their agency across a broad front of activities was the veterans organization, whether general organizations for all veterans, or those organized around specific disabilities. In the years just after World War I, there was an unprecedented scale of activity in establishing new veterans organizations, and older organizations greatly expanded in size.ⁿ¹⁰⁷

Disabled veterans were often slower than the able-bodied to organize because of the overwhelming and protracted medical, rehabilitation, and personal demands of treatment of and adjustment to impairments incurred in adulthood as a consequence of trauma. Some disabled veterans depended on the general veterans organizations to be their advocates. These organizations took their role seriously as advocates in negotiations with the state.

During the twentieth century, democratic states, such as the United States, Australia, and Canada, assimilated both disabled and able-bodied veterans into interest group politics.ⁿ¹⁰⁸ These large, general veterans' organizations were

eventually given the formal role of representing men in institutional proceedings with the state over pension and other matters affecting disabled veterans.ⁿ¹⁰⁹ Disabled veterans complained that these organizations often had a patronizing "We'll take care of you" attitudeⁿ¹¹⁰ that **[*100]** subverted their claims to civic dignity and authority regarding their own condition and welfare. Partially in response to this perception, disabled veterans created their own organizations. These organizations formed especially among the most severely impaired, such as the brain-injured, the blinded, amputees, the facially disfigured, the tubercular, and the hearing impaired.ⁿ¹¹¹

Though both the general and disabled veterans organizations deeply bore the mark of the surrounding political cultures, such organizations did not exist solely to work for public benefits. They had a wide variety of sometimes overlapping purposes: commemorative, ideological and partisan, solidaristic and inspirational, and social and recreational.ⁿ¹¹² In this sense, the disabled and general organizations resembled one another, but these functions provided a special significance in the case of disabled veterans. The psychological problems associated with adjustment during adulthood to severe disability demanded solidarity and mutual support. The isolation caused by the communication or mobility of men with disabilities and general demoralization could be combated through the publication of a newsletter or a magazine and the maintenance of a calendar of events.ⁿ¹¹³

The activities of veterans' organizations in Great Britain and Germany in the post-World War I period illustrate the influence of the disabled veterans on public policy and programs. Disabled veterans in England and Germany, despite greatly different circumstances, felt deep discontent with the quality and funding of benefits in both countries. The British state, even though it was responsible for the inadequacy of pensions, did little to help men find adequate work.ⁿ¹¹⁴ The government left this responsibility mostly to voluntary and philanthropic efforts at the local level.ⁿ¹¹⁵ The state's absence from most disabled veterans' daily struggles for self-sufficiency deflected criticism from **[*101]** the government and inspired gratitude for what benevolent and cooperative segments of the public did for men on an individual basis.ⁿ¹¹⁶

The British Legion, the principal organization of British World War I veterans, able-bodied and disabled alike, played a large role in forging this non-confrontational stance.ⁿ¹¹⁷ The Legion defined itself as an association of victorious heroes, whose dignity was best maintained by refusing to build a political entity solely around benefits and services.ⁿ¹¹⁸ It expressed gratitude to the public for its acts of benevolence and urged veterans to reject partisanship and protest demonstrations.ⁿ¹¹⁹ The Legion was ambivalent about the question of employment for the severely disabled.ⁿ¹²⁰ It campaigned for preferential treatment and systematic distribution of disabled veterans throughout the economy, but it also argued that those with severe impairments should be exempt from work if they so chose.ⁿ¹²¹ In their struggle to wrest control of the fluctuating size of job cohorts from employers, the British trade unions had their own suspicions of vocational rehabilitation placements of disabled workers, though the unions did not oppose the programs as long as they were given a role in their administration.ⁿ¹²²

The German situation, not as bad from a material perspective, differed in a complex way, since the context included defeat, demoralization, and severe economic problems that were deeper and more structural than the contraction that followed the war in Britain.ⁿ¹²³ The public had little to celebrate in the war experience and seemed eager to move on as quickly as possible.ⁿ¹²⁴

A Central European pattern, shared with Austria, was to have large organizations not limited to disabled veterans, but composed of all war victims.ⁿ¹²⁵ Far from being nonpartisan, these organizations were strongly **[*102]** affiliated with political movements and ideologies across the conventional Right-Left spectrum. In 1922, six organizations incorporated 1,400,000 German war victims into their membership.ⁿ¹²⁶ On both the Left and the Right, the Weimar Republic, which had come to power amidst the chaos that accompanied Germany's unanticipated defeat late in 1918, lacked legitimacy. Attacks on the new republic were an important element in the struggle for power and grew more intense with the arrival of the Great Depression.ⁿ¹²⁷

In contrast to the more tepid response of the British Legion, the German war victims' organizations believed that work was central to normalization.ⁿ¹²⁸ They shared similar critiques on matters such as the inadequacy of pensions and

the dehumanizing aspects of the bureaucratic processes involved in dispensing benefits.ⁿ¹²⁹ They did not, however, forge a common front.

Each organization staged demonstrations on behalf of its own partisans among war victims and used these well-staged events as propaganda for its larger ideological challenge to the state.ⁿ¹³⁰ The Left had been distrustful of vocational rehabilitation programs for disabled veterans since their inception during the war.ⁿ¹³¹ Its large industrial unions suspected these programs were part of a capitalist-state strategy to undermine the hard-won gains that unions had achieved in bargaining power over the size of job cohorts.ⁿ¹³²

The high socioeconomic status of the volunteers working in the war-time programs, the role of employers in providing inspiration and coordination, and the lack of representation of the unions at the various levels of the programs, lent credibility to these suspicions.ⁿ¹³³ The change of regime did not necessarily make the state less of an object of distrust, especially at the far **[*103]** ends of the political spectrum. In any circumstance, criticism served the larger ends of questioning the legitimacy of the new republic. Though different, both critiques of vocational rehabilitation overlapped to the extent that they shared a common distrust of state authority and activities. In the 1920s, German disabled veterans entered the ranks of the bitterest critics of the government. Their protests contributed to the delegitimization of the Weimar Republic. They also provided a context in which it would fail and the Nazi regime would rise to power in 1933. While the Nazi regime made a great symbolic show of advocacy for disabled veterans, it was an especially bitter irony that the low pension rates it offered forced many who had left employment during the Depression to seek work again, and its administration of benefit programs was as cost-conscious and impersonal as that of the Republic.ⁿ¹³⁴

VIII. The State's Role in the World War II Era

In the 1920s and 1930s, the major belligerents engaged in World War I came to feel that the policies and programs they had developed to provide disabled veterans with benefits were flawed and inadequate. Although the programs and policies themselves differed from nation to nation, the critiques ultimately were alike. The Great Depression made it impossible to marshal the resources to correct many of the failures, but World War II provided an opportunity for doing so, except in Germany. Germany's second defeat in a quarter-century led to a comprehensive reconstruction of state and society by the four principal occupying powers.ⁿ¹³⁵ The desire to apply the lessons learned from the experience of World War I formed a growing consensus among the victorious, developed, and industrial nations on the terms of providing benefits for disabled veterans.

Among the victors, the heart of this consensus was the assumption that the two welfare systems should continue to be separate.ⁿ¹³⁶ Societies as different as the Soviet Union, Canada, and the United States maintained veterans' welfare systems more generous in scope and scale of its activities than the general welfare system serving the civilian population.ⁿ¹³⁷ Great Britain stands out as a partial exception to this consensus in that it had less separation of veterans from general welfare policy after World War II and **[*104]** more equalization of benefits and pensions.ⁿ¹³⁸

The explanation lies in both war-time conditions and post-war politics in Britain. British planners and policymakers reasoned that the massive bombing of British cities, which targeted neighborhoods and workplaces, blurred the distinction between civilian and military casualties. The drafting of civilians into war-work in industry and agriculture reinforced this reasoning.ⁿ¹³⁹ In the ideological context of Britain's post-war social democratic mood, that emphasized building an egalitarian and democratic welfare state, the universalization of many benefits seemed appropriate.ⁿ¹⁴⁰

From the perspective of governments, the principal challenge presented by correcting mistakes of the past was finding ways for the state to provide quality services, humanely administered to large numbers of deserving men in the service of normalizing their post-war lives, while containing costs, especially long-term costs.ⁿ¹⁴¹ Based on the lessons of the inadequacies of the hesitant state activities during and after World War I, and on the increasing presence in all Western nations of the welfare state, it was now accepted that whatever use the voluntary and philanthropic sector might be, it was the state's responsibility to oversee the process of providing the opportunities for normalizing the existence of

disabled veterans and to fund the major initiatives involved.

Two methods were used to address this challenge. First, governments increasingly conceded the necessity of large short-term and medium-term investments to avoid long-term dependencies. Governments became heavily involved in subsidizing post-service medical care, comprehensive vocational rehabilitation and general education, a wide-range of practical assistive technologies (from folding or motorized wheelchairs to hand-controlled automobiles), white cane training for the blinded, and adapted environments, such as homes designed for wheelchair users.ⁿ¹⁴²

Second, in the belief that their experience would lead to efficient, cost-conscious, and compassionate management, governments brought disabled [*105] veterans and their organizations into the process of planning and administering the expanding state bureaucracies that affected the welfare of disabled veterans. It was, of course, not illogical that the veterans of World War I would want to correct the errors to which they were subject, and hence desired to administer the programs and policies of World War II.ⁿ¹⁴³

Another development lay in applying lessons learned from attempting to attribute precisely disabilities and illnesses to service-connected circumstances. Pension officials discovered in the 1920s and 1930s that many veterans' impairments and illnesses that were claimed to be service connected often existed prior to induction in the military. Military service had exacerbated, not caused these conditions. Still, military service established an expensive national obligation to assist the individual through pensions, vocational rehabilitation, medical care, and other benefits. When and where circumstances allowed for systematic manpower planning in the armed forces, as in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Great Britain during World War II, governments raised induction standards in order to exempt from military service or to provide limited national service opportunities for applicants who, prior to service, were already impaired, ill, or psychologically unstable.ⁿ¹⁴⁴

The post-1945 experience in the Western capitalist nations and in Japan of a quarter-century of unprecedented economic expansion, which had its complement on a lesser scale in the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, made possible these various initiatives and improvements in providing for disabled veterans. The post-1970 economic contraction, which accompanied the reintegration of the world market and the decline in the developed world of the mass production industrial economy of the Second Industrial Revolution, again made these benefits problematic. United States and Australian veterans of the Vietnam War and Russian veterans of the Afghanistan War returned home to find that the state was no longer able to deal with their needs on as generous a scale as it had dealt with their fathers' needs after World War II.ⁿ¹⁴⁵ Yet they received greater benefits than their [*106] grandfathers who had fought in World War I had received. Growth in all facets of the programs that benefited disabled veterans in the Western industrial nations marked the principal development in the relationship between these veterans, the state, and society in the twentieth century.

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

Labor & Employment Law Disability & Unemployment Insurance Disability Benefits Coverage & Definitions Disabilities Military & Veterans Law Veterans General Overview Public Health & Welfare Law Social Services Disabled & Elderly Persons General Overview

FOOTNOTES:

n1. There has never been a syncretical or interpretive history of disabled veterans of military service. *Disabled Veterans in History* (David A. Gerber ed., 2000) is a collection of fourteen essays that contribute to the general history that needs to be written. The introduction for the collection contains discussions of issues of public policy, representation, and disabled veterans' experience (agency, identity, and

organization) based mostly on English-language historical and social science literature. Id. at 1-51.

n2. For purposes of convenience, throughout this essay, veterans are contrasted with civilians, though the veteran, of course, eventually becomes a civilian. Civilian is used to signify those who have not served in the armed forces. Veteran is employed to identify military personnel as soon as they leave active service, though they are still formally in the armed forces. In effect, servicemen become veterans for the purposes of this essay when they become too ill or injured to be active in the field. It is also necessary to distinguish between those disabled while in the armed forces and those disabled after leaving the armed forces. This distinction seems obvious, but public benefits have in certain times and places been available to both cohorts on the basis of disability and veteran's status. While this Article mentions the latter group, it is devoted to the situation of the man disabled during active service. For ancient texts that date the recognition of disability resulting from warfare as a singular experience, see Martha Edwards, *Philoctetes in Historical Context*, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, supra note 1, at 55-69. See also Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (1994).

n3. Rose Entleman, *Two Hundred Years of Military Medicine* (1975); Peter Dorland & James Nanney, *Dust Off: Army Aeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam* 9, 122 (1982); Technical Information Division, Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, *The Physically Disabled*, 239 *Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.* 10, 10-19 (1945).

n4. Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* 528 (1992) [hereinafter *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*]; Geoffrey Lewis Hudson, *Ex-Service Men, War Widows, and the English County Pension Scheme, 1593-1679* (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University) (on file with author); Robert I. Goler & Michael G. Rhode, *From Individual Trauma to National Policy: Tracking the Uses of Civil War Veteran Military Records*, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, supra note 1, at 163-84; Michael Geyer, *Ein Verbot des Wohlfahrtsstaates: Die Kriegsopferversorgung in Frankreich, Deutschland und Grossbritannien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, 9 *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft* 230-77 (1983).

n5. For particularly significant work on military pensions in the United States context, see, e.g., *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, supra note 4 (considering technical questions such as take-up rates for Civil War pensions and average pensions in U.S. dollars throughout history); Theda Skocpol, *America's First Social Security System: The Expansion of Benefits for Civil War Veterans*, 108 *Pol. Sci. Q.* 85, 85-115 (1993) (discussing the political justifications for pension-spending after the Civil War); Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, *Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America*, 52 *Ala. L. Rev.* 1, 3-4, 7-8 (2000) (examining the percentage of federal funds spent on disabled veterans); and Peter David Blanck, *Civil War Pensions and Disability*, 62 *Ohio St. L. J.* 109, 109-238 (2001) (analyzing the results of empirical studies on disability pensions and attitudes toward Civil War veterans with disabilities).

n6. See Simi Linton, *Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity* 8-14 (1998) (discussing the process of categorizing disabilities in various cultures and eras); Rosemarie Garland Thomson, *Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature* 5-9 (1997) (analyzing cultural representations of disability). See generally Henri-Jacques Stiker, *A History of Disability* 1-22 (1999) (considering how disability has been conceptualized by various cultures throughout time).

n7. The neo-European world includes the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

n8. See Douglas C. McMurtrie, *The Evolution of National Systems of Vocational Reeducation for Disabled Soldiers and Sailors* (1918) [hereinafter *The Evolution of National Systems*]. See generally Douglas C. McMurtrie, *The Disabled Soldier* (1919) [hereinafter *The Disabled Soldier*]; Edward T. Devine, *Disabled Soldiers and Sailors: Pensions and Training* 3-17 (1919). These are not so much comparative studies as works written during and just after World War I with multinational frameworks that sometimes engage in systematic comparative study. *The Disabled Soldier* is the most consistently comparative. For contemporary studies, see Geyer, *supra* note 4, at 230-77; Deborah Cohen, *Will to Work: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany After the First World War*, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, *supra* note 1, at 295-321 [hereinafter *Will to Work*]; and Debra Cohen, *The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914-1939* (2001).

n9. See Edward D. Berkowitz, *America's Welfare State: From Roosevelt to Reagan* 17 (1991) [hereinafter *America's Welfare State*] (discussing pension plans for Civil War veterans).

n10. *Id.* at 2; Bruce S. Jansson, *The Reluctant Welfare State: A History of American Welfare Policies* 166 (1993) (recognizing the New Deal as the beginning of the modern welfare state in the United States).

n11. *America's Welfare State*, *supra* note 9, at xv; Jansson, *supra* note 10, at 2-3.

n12. *America's Welfare State*, *supra* note 9, at 17-18, 52; Jansson, *supra* note 10, at 321; see also William DeMaria, *Combat and Concern: The Warfare-Welfare Nexus*, 7 *War and Soc'y* 71, 71-85 (1989) (exploring the shifting boundaries of the two welfare states); Sar Levitan & Karen A. Cleary, *Old Wars Remain Unfinished: The Veterans Benefits System* (1973) (discussing the U.S. veterans' welfare system).

n13. Historical studies in the United States have been very slow to adopt transnational perspectives. The call for adopting transnational frameworks grew steadily during the 1990s and eventually led to a special issue of the principal journal of American history. See Ian Tyrrell, *American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History*, 96 *Am. Hist. Rev.* 1031, 1031-55 (1991); Donna R. Gabaccia, *Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Immigration Historians*, 84 *J. Am. Hist.* 570, 570-75 (1997); Symposium, *The National and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History - A Special Issue*, 86 *J. Am. Hist.* 965 (1999).

n14. *The Disabled Soldier*, *supra* note 8, at 20-21.

n15. *Id.* at 16.

n16. *Id.* at 14; Isser Woloch, *The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration* 4 (1979) [hereinafter *The French Veteran*].

n17. *The Disabled Soldier*, supra note 8, at 14; *The French Veteran*, supra note 16, at 4.

n18. *The French Veteran*, supra note 16, at 4.

n19. *Id.*

n20. Marcel Prevost, *Aid for Disabled Soldiers in France Before 1670*, 8 *Am. J. Care of Cripples* 405, 405-18 (1919); *The Disabled Soldier*, supra note 8, at 15-19; *The French Veteran*, supra note 16, at 4-5; Isser Woloch, *A Sacred Debt: Veterans and the State in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France*, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, supra note 1, at 146, 150.

n21. *The Disabled Soldier*, supra note 8, at 20; Geoffrey L. Hudson, *Disabled Veterans and the State in Early Modern Europe*, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, supra note 1, at 136-37.

n22. Sidney Forman, *Why the United States Military Academy Was Established in 1802*, 29 *Mil. Aff.* 16, 19 (1965).

n23. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, supra note 4, at 102-51; John William Oliver, *History of the Civil War Military Pensions, 1861-1885* (1917); William G. Glasson, *Federal Military Pensions in the United States* 125-75 (1918).

n24. Maris A. Vinovskis, *Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War? Some Preliminary Demographic Speculations*, 76 *J. Am. Hist.* 34, 53-54 (1989).

n25. *Id.* at 21.

n26. *Id.* at 52-54.

n27. Desmond Morton & Glenn Wright, *Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930*, at ix-xii, 10, 12-13, 45 (1987).

n28. *Id.*

n29. Clem Lloyd & Jacquie Rees, *The Last Shilling: A History of Repatriation in Australia* 239-40 (1994) [hereinafter *The Last Shilling*].

n30. *Id.*

n31. John Hockenberry, *Moving Violations: War Zones, Wheelchairs, and Declarations of Independence* 236-80 (1995).

n32. *Id.*

n33. *Id.* at 236.

n34. Id. at 237.

n35. Id. at 237-41.

n36. Hockenberry, *supra* note 31, at 275-80.

n37. Ethel Dunn, Disabled Russian War Veterans: Surviving the Collapse of the Soviet Union, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, *supra* note 1, at 251-71; Bernice Madison, Programs for the Disabled in the Soviet Union, in *The Disabled in the Soviet Union: Past and Present, Theory and Practice* 172-88 (William McCagg and Lewis Siegelbaum eds., 1989) [hereinafter *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*].

n38. Id.

n39. Id.

n40. Jock McCulloch, *The Politics of Agent Orange: The Australian Experience* 153-57 (1984).

n41. Stephen P. Dunn & Ethel Dunn, Everyday Life of the Disabled in the USSR, in *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*, *supra* note 37, at 228.

n42. Id.

n43. Id.

n44. Id.

n45. Id.

n46. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 131.

n47. Will to Work, *supra* note 8, at 312.

n48. Robert Weldon Whalen, *Bitter Wounds: German Victims of the Great War, 1914-1939*, at 39-40, 55-56, 156 (1984).

n49. Antoine Prost, *Les Anciens Combattants et La Societe Francaise, 1914-1939*, at 13 (1977) [hereinafter *Les Anciens Combattants*].

n50. Id.; Devine, *supra* note 8, at 131; Morton & Wright, *supra* note 27, at ix; Richard Severo & Lewis Milford, *The Wages of War: When America's Soldiers Came Home - From Valley Forge to Vietnam* 247-48 (1989); Whalen, *supra* note 48.

n51. The Iran-Iraq War was fought from 1980-1988.

n52. Will to Work, *supra* note 8, at 295-312; Whalen, *supra* note 48, at 141-65.

n53. R.B. Rosenberg, *Living Monuments: Confederate Soldiers' Homes in the New South* 56-72 (1993); R.B. Rosenberg, "Empty Sleeves and Wooden Pegs": Disabled Confederate Veterans in Image and Reality, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, supra note 1, at 204-28.

n54. Stiker, supra note 6, at 123-28; *The Evolution of National Systems*, supra note 8, at 11-12; *The Disabled Soldier*, supra note 8, at 50-71; Jeffrey Reznick, *Work-Therapy and the Disabled British Soldier in Great Britain in the First World War: The Case of Shepherd's Bush Military Hospital, London*, in *Disabled Veterans in History*, supra note 1, at 187-88.

n55. Devine, supra note 8, at 27-28.

n56. *Id.* at 50-71.

n57. For studies of modernist progressivism, see generally the following studies of developments in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany: Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (1967); Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920* (1964); Michael Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (1978); *Government and Expertise: Specialization, Administrators, and Professionals, 1860-1919* (Roy M. MacLeod ed., 1988); Allen Mitchell, *The Divided Path: The German Influence on Social Reform in France After 1870* (1991); Charles E. McClelland, *The German Experience of Professionalization: Modern Learned Professions and Their Organizations from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Hitler Era* (1991). Edward Devine goes furthest among analysts at the time toward understanding the emergence of this consensus as well as its limitations and progressivist ideological roots. Devine, supra note 8, at 385-90.

n58. *The Evolution of National Systems*, supra note 8. On the professionalization of vocational rehabilitation, see Edward Berkowitz, *Disabled Policy: America's Programs for the Handicapped 155-74* (1987) [hereinafter *Disabled Policy*]. On the professionalization of the allied disciplines, physical and occupational rehabilitation, with discussion of their relationship to vocational rehabilitation, see Glenn Gritzer & Arnold Arluke, *The Making of Rehabilitation: A Political Economy of Medical Specialization, 1890-1980*, at 38-60 (1985).

n59. Devine, supra note 8, at 385-90 (explaining the emergence of this consensus, as well as its limitations and progressivist ideological roots).

n60. *The Evolution of National Systems*, supra note 8; *The Disabled Soldier*, supra note 8. On the professionalization of vocational rehabilitation, see generally *Disabled Policy*, supra note 58, at 155-74; and on the professionalization of the allied disciplines as well as physical and occupational rehabilitation, with discussion of their relationship to vocational rehabilitation, see Gritzer & Arluke, supra note 58, at 38-60.

n61. The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at i.

n62. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 133-84; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 105-06, 209-16.

n63. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 133-84; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 105-06, 209-16.

n64. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 149; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 212.

n65. The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 37.

n66. *Id.*

n67. See generally The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8.

n68. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 85-86; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 44.

n69. Reznick, *supra* note 54, at 191, 194-95.

n70. *Id.*

n71. The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 64-65; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 194-95.

n72. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 65; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 27, 174-80; Devine, *supra* note 8, at 189.

n73. The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 44-45.

n74. The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 36-37, 149; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 43, 47, 102-03.

n75. The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 36-37, 149; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 43, 47, 102-03.

n76. See generally The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8; Devine, *supra* note 8. The question of control in relation to stereotypes of the working classes pervades these three principal surveys of World War I vocational rehabilitation.

n77. Salvatore Saladino, Italy from Unification to 1919: Growth and Decay of a Liberal Regime 52-61 (1970); Frank J. Coppa, Planning, Protectionism, and Politics in the Giolittian Age (1971); Luciano Cafagna, Italy, 1830-1914, in *The Emergence of Industrial Societies* 279-328 (Carlo M. Cipolla ed., 1976); The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 120.

n78. Saladino, *supra* note 77; Coppa, *supra* note 77; Cafagna, *supra* note 77; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 120.

n79. Saladino, *supra* note 77; Coppa, *supra* note 77; Cafagna, *supra* note 77; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 120.

n80. Saladino, *supra* note 77; Coppa, *supra* note 77; Cafagna, *supra* note 77; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 120.

n81. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 109-11.

n82. *Id.* at 113, 120-21; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 182-84.

n83. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 113.

n84. *Id.* at 109-21; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 180-84.

n85. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 134-35.

n86. *Id.* at 136.

n87. *Id.*

n88. *Id.*

n89. *Id.* at 136-58.

n90. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 133-39; The Disabled Soldier, *supra* note 8, at 209-10; Will to Work, *supra* note 8, at 298.

n91. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871-1918* (Kim Traynor trans., 1989); John C.G. Röhl, *Germany Without Bismark: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900* (1967); Jürgen Kocka, *German History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German "Sonderweg,"* 23 *J. Contemp. Hist.* 3, 3-16 (1988).

n92. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 294.

n93. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 290-93; Will to Work, *supra* note 8, at 301-02; Konrad Biesalski, *Kriegskoppel Fursorge: Ein Aufklärungswort zum Trost und zur Mahnung* 4 (1915).

n94. The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 213.

n95. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 294-303; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 149; Disabled Soldiers, *supra* note 8, at 210-13.

n96. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 294-303; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 149; Disabled Soldiers, *supra* note 8, at 210-13.

n97. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 294-303; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 149; Disabled Soldiers, *supra* note 8, at 210-13.

n98. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 294-303; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 149; Disabled Soldiers, *supra* note 8, at 210-13.

n99. Devine, *supra* note 8, at 294-303; The Evolution of National Systems, *supra* note 8, at 149; Disabled Soldiers, *supra* note 8, at 210-13.

n100. Will to Work, supra note 8, at 296; The Evolution of National Systems, supra note 8, at 134; The Disabled Soldier, supra note 8, at 214; Devine, supra note 8, at 314.

n101. Will to Work, supra note 8, at 295, 300-09; Whalen, supra note 48, at 16-18, 131-60.

n102. Will to Work, supra note 8, at 295, 300-09; Whalen, supra note 48, at 16-18, 131-60.

n103. Will to Work, supra note 8, at 295, 300-09; Whalen, supra note 48, at 16-18, 131-60.

n104. Will to Work, supra note 8, at 295, 300-09; Whalen, supra note 48, at 16-18, 131-60.

n105. Will to Work, supra note 8, at 306-12; Whalen, supra note 48, at 162-70.

n106. Will to Work, supra note 8, at 295-300, 302-04, 309-10; Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain, and the Great War* 53, 60-71 (1996).

n107. William Pencak, *For God and Country: The American Legion, 1919-1941*, at 176-97 (1989); Lloyd & Rees, supra note 29, at 187-208; Morton & Wright, supra note 27, at 62-83; Antoine Prost, *In the Wake of War: Les Anciens Combattants and French Society, 1914-1939*, at 30-46 (1992) (summarizing his vast, multi-volume study, *Les Anciens Combattants*, supra note 49, which contains data on the affiliation patterns of thousands of French veterans) [hereinafter *In the Wake of War*]; *The War Generation: Veterans of the First World War* (Stephen R. Ward ed., 1975) [hereinafter *The War Generation*] (providing essays on a number of major World War I belligerents).

n108. Geyer, supra note 4, at 230-34; Lloyd & Rees, supra note 29, at 416; Pencak, supra note 107, at 177-79, 185-86, 195-97; Morton & Wright, supra note 27, at 70, 75, 140-41.

n109. Geyer, *supra* note 4, at 230-34; Lloyd & Rees, *supra* note 29, at 416; Pencak, *supra* note 107, at 177-79, 185-86, 195-97; Morton & Wright, *supra* note 27, at 70, 75, 140-41.

n110. This characterization of the attitudes of able-bodied veterans who led the general membership veterans organizations is used in explaining the origins of the Blinded Veterans Association, which was founded in March 1945, by blinded U.S. servicemen. See Robert Brown & Hope Schutte, *Our Fight: A Battle Against Darkness* 16 (1991); see also *In the Wake of War*, *supra* note 107, at 31-33.

n111. *In the Wake of War*, *supra* note 107, at 29-33, 45; Whalen, *supra* note 48, at 118-28, 162; Morton & Wright, *supra* note 27, at 142, 185-86, 207-11; Bourke, *supra* note 106, at 46, 71, 74; *The Evolution of National Systems*, *supra* note 8, at 132; Pencak, *supra* note 107, at 50.

n112. The broad range of motivations behind the creation of veterans organizations provided a case study that weaves its way through the classic theoretical statement of collective organization in modern political systems. See Mancur Olson Sr., *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* 2-3, 11, 14-16, 21, 34, 48, 132, 142, 160-61 (1965); see also William Waller, *The Veteran Returns Home* 193-202 (1944); Alfred Vogts, *A History of Militarism* 386-90 (1937).

n113. Variable patterns of affiliation are well documented for post-World War I French society. See *In the Wake of War*, *supra* note 107, at 50. Prost also establishes that the leaders of the general French veterans organizations were twice as likely to be disabled than able-bodied. *Id.* at 45. While I have been unable to find other studies asking the same questions for other national experiences, Prost's findings are confirmed by my own observations of the intense solidarity and sociability among members of the Blinded Veterans Association, an United States organization. David A. Gerber, *Blind and Enlightened: An Enquiry into the Civil Rights Politics of the Blinded Veterans Association*, in *The New Disability History: American Perspectives* 313-38 (2001).

n114. *Will to Work*, *supra* note 8, at 295-304.

n115. *Id.*

n116. *Id.* at 309. Cohen's comparative analysis contrasts the political consequences of disabled veterans policy in Germany and Great

Britain. It finds that in spite of the generosity of the Weimar Republic, relative to the parsimony and lack of activity of the British government on behalf of disabled veterans, the German veterans were much more bitter toward the German public and the government than were their British counterparts. Cohen's subtle analysis involves both an understanding of policy and programs and an exploration of contrasting political cultures and national war-time and post-war psychologies.

n117. *Id.*

n118. *Id.*

n119. *Will to Work*, *supra* note 8, at 309.

n120. *Id.* at 306, 309-10; Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946*, at 53-54 (1994).

n121. *Will to Work*, *supra* note 8, at 309; Gregory, *supra* note 120.

n122. *The Disabled Soldier*, *supra* note 8, at 82-84.

n123. *Id.* at 81-84, 190-91; Bourke, *supra* note 106, at 72.

n124. *Will to Work*, *supra* note 8, at 311-12.

n125. *The Disabled Soldier*, *supra* note 8, at 81-84, 190-91; Bourke, *supra* note 106, at 72.

n126. Whalen, *supra* note 48, at 115-28, 173-76; James M. Diehl, *Germany: Veteran's Politics Under Three Flags* 142-52 (1975) [hereinafter *Veteran's Politics Under Three Flags*]. Both the Italian and French disabled veterans' movements were also deeply divided ideologically. See generally *The War Generation*, *supra* note 107; Robert Soucy, *France: Veteran's Politics Between the Wars* 59-103 (1975); Michael A. Ledeen, *Italy - War as a Style of Life* 104-34 (1975).

n127. Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic* 4 (1988); Detlev J.K. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity* 2 (1992); Ben Fowkes, *Communism in Germany Under the Weimar Republic* (1984); Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany* 212-49 (1990); Kurt Sontheimer, *Anti-Democratic Thought in the Weimar Republic*, in *The Path to Dictatorship 1918-1933: Ten Essays* (John Conny trans., 1966).

n128. *Will to Work*, *supra* note 8, at 306-10.

n129. *Id.* at 310; Devine, *supra* note 8, 286-87, 311-12, 314; Whalen, *supra* note 48, at 141-52.

n130. *Will to Work*, *supra* note 8, at 310; *Veteran's Politics Under Three Flags*, *supra* note 126, at 141-52; Whalen, *supra* note 49, at 115-16, 118, 128, 151, 167-73.

n131. *The Evolution of National Systems*, *supra* note 8, at 161, 169-70, 182-84.

n132. *Id.*

n133. *Will to Work*, *supra* note 8, at 310; *The Evolution of National Systems*, *supra* note 8, at 161, 169-70, 182-84; Devine *supra* note 8, at 286-314; Whalen, *supra* note 48, at 115-18, 151-53; *Veteran's Politics Under Three Flags*, *supra* note 126, at 142-43.

n134. James M. Diehl, Change and Continuity in the Treatment of German Kriegsofper, 18 Cent. Eur. Hist. 170, 173-76 (1988); James M. Diehl, Victors or Victims?: Disabled Veterans in the Third Reich, 59 J. Mod. Hist. 705, 705-36 (1987).

n135. James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans After World War II (1993); Change and Continuity in Treatment of the German Kriegsofper, *supra* note 134, at 177-87.

n136. Robert England, Twenty Million Veterans 5-8 (1950); Madison, *supra* note 37, at 185-88; Bourke, *supra* note 106, at 43-44, 66-67.

n137. England, *supra* note 136, at 5-6.

n138. *Id.*

n139. *Id.*

n140. *Id.* at 5-8; Madison, *supra* note 37, at 185-88; Bourke, *supra* note 106, at 43-44, 66-67.

n141. See generally Kenneth O. Morgan, *The People's Peace: British History, 1945-1990* (1992); Derek Fraser, *The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy Since the Industrial Revolution* (1973).

n142. Madison, *supra* note 37, at 187; Lloyd & Rees, *supra* note 29, at 317-18; Mary Tremblay, Going Back to Civvy Street: A Historical Account of the Impact of the Everest and Jennings Wheelchair for Canadian World War II Veterans with Spinal Cord Injury, 11 Disability & Soc'y, 149, 149-66 (1996); Richard Hoover, The Cane as a Travel Aid, in *Blindness*, 353-65 (Paul A. Zahl ed., 1950); Brown & Schutte, *supra* note 110, at 15, 42-54; Roger Bates Boatwright, *The Social Adjustment of Eleven World War II Veterans to Paraplegia* (1952) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Southern Methodist University) (on file with Southern Methodist University); Gritzer & Arluke, *supra* note 28, at 86-122.

n143. Theodore Newcomb & Amos H. Hawley, Rehabilitation Services of Veterans Organizations, 239 *Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.* 160, 160-64 (1945); Jeff Keshen, Getting It Right the Second Time Around the Reintegration of Canadian Veterans of World War II, in *The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada* 62, 64-65 (Peter Neary & J. L. Granatstein, eds., 1997) [hereinafter *The Veterans Charter*]; Mary Tremblay, Going Back to Main Street: The Development and Impact of Casualty Rehabilitation for Veterans with Disabilities, in *The Veterans Charter* 160, 166, 171 (taking examples from the Canadian and United States experiences).

n144. William C. Menninger, The Mentally or Emotionally Handicapped Veteran, 239 *Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.* 23 (1945); N-P, *Time*, May 29, 1944, at 44, 46; England, *supra* note 136, at 164, 176; Lloyd & Rees, *supra* note 29, at 266-77; Dixon Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home 391 (1945); Terry Copp, From Neurasthenia to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Canadian Veterans and the Problem of Persistent Emotional Disabilities, in *The Veterans Charter*, *supra* note 143, at 149, 152-54.

n145. Madison, *supra* note 37, at 185-88; Paul D. Raymond, Disability as Dissidence: The Action Group to Defend the Rights of the Disabled in the USSR, in *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*, *supra* note 37, at 245-46, 251 nn.35, 37; Lloyd & Rees, *supra* note 29, at 416-18; Robert Klein, *Wounded Men, Broken Promises* (1981).